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Justice and Art, Face to Face
Desmond Manderson and Cristina S. Martinez*
This essay studies in detail, for the first time and in the context of legal
as well as art history, Sir Joshua Reynolds's representation of Justice
(1779). We argue that the image is of particular significance in the history
of representations of justice, and marks the emergence of neoclassical
ideals. These ideals became, for example in the work of Sir William
Blackstone, central to the development of Anglo-American concepts of the
common law. We argue that Reynolds's work exemplifies a profound shift
and a rich complexity in these concepts. Our study also reveals the ways
in which the artist's aesthetic practice and precedents gave him unique
insights into the form and ideas of Justice. More than this, we suggest that
the relationship between legal ideas and portraiture is suggestive for how
the relationship between abstract norms and individual cases ought to be
mediated - both in the formative period of the late eighteenth century, and
now. The connection between law and art helps not only to clarify but to
develop and more richly comprehend both the history and the implications
of legal concepts. Not in philosophy or jurisprudence or political theory is
justice's struggle between particular and general most productively
encountered, but in the dual cases of portraiture and common law.
* Professor Desmond Manderson, Centrefor Law, Arts andHumanities, ANU College of Law &
College ofArts and Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra ACT AUSTRALIA
2600, Email: desmond.manderson@anu.edu.au, Vox: +61 2 61970057.
Cristina S. Martinez, PhD, Adjunct Professor, Department of Visual Arts, University of Ottawa,
Email: martinezcsm@gmail.com, Vox: +1 613 8844573.
Our exploration of this image and these themes derives from a surprising convergence. We
discovered only recently that we had been working independently along very similar lines, specifically
on the relationship between Sir Joshua Reynolds and Sir William Blackstone, the greatest artist and
the greatest legal writer of the English Enlightenment. Indeed, Martinez's interest dates from her
doctoral dissertation completed several years ago. This research will soon appear as chapters in two
books on which we are now working: that of Cristina S. Martinez on law and art in England in the
eighteenth century, and that of Desmond Manderson on law, time, and the visual arts from 1500 to the
present. But these very different projects converge in the person of Reynolds, and in particular in our
recent research on the personification of Justice, a work completed in the late 1770s. Rather than write
separately on the same painting, it seemed to us both more equable and more exciting to collaborate in
an article that explores the significance of this image for a wider public. The present work represents
the fruits of this collaboration.
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I. SIR JOSHUA REYNOLDS AND THE NEO-CLASSICAL MOMENT
What form does justice take when rendered visually? How does that
form change in different times and places? These questions invite us to
reflect on the relationship between the ideology and the aesthetics of law.
Such a reflection helps illuminate for us underlying limits, ambiguities and
tensions that inhere in our concepts of justice: between rigour and
compassion, the universal and the particular, judgment and expression, the
cry of order on the one hand, and the plea for balance on the other.
Furthermore, and equally importantly, what does the particular training
and sensibility of the artist bring to these matters? This essay explores
these questions in the specific context of the work of Sir Joshua Reynolds.
In what sense, we ask, is the justice of the portrait and the portrait of
justice intertwined? How might our insights of one inform and enrich our
understanding of the other?
The eighteenth century is dominated by an intellectual movement now
known as neoclassicism, though it went by no such name at the time. This
movement had its origins in response to the excesses and sensuality of the
baroque and rococo, drawing first on the rationalism and humanism of the
late seventeenth century. Michel Foucault, attending largely to French
sources, argues that the Western episteme underwent a profound
transformation in the late seventeenth century.' During the Renaissance,
argued Foucault, the structure of thinking was essentially metaphorical.
The parallels between elements, even of quite different kinds, yielded
clues as to their underlying meaning. The look of a walnut, to take one
well-known example, was thought to indicate its connection to the brain.
"These buried similitudes must be indicated on the surface of things; there
must be visible marks for the invisible analogies."2 In the Renaissance
period, all meaning, said Foucault, is circulatory, textual, and
interpretative. There is no other way of knowing than by the accumulation
and discourse of texts. History is an ever-ramifying textual discourse, and
"the task of commentary can never, by definition, be completed."
3
In the neo-classical period, this obsession with the accumulation of and
relation between signs was overturned. The logic of similitude was
replaced by a logic of identity, difference, measurement and order. The
classical thinker sought not the resemblance of things, but their
tabulation-in other words, their separation and their placement within a
hierarchical and taxonomic order. According to Foucault, "this relation to
order is as essential to the classical age as the relation to interpretation
was to the Renaissance."'4 As he observes:
1. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES
(1973).
2. Id. at 26.
3. Id. at 41.
4. Id. at 57.
2016]
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From now on, every resemblance must be subjected to proof by
comparison, that is, it will not be accepted until its identity and the
series of its differences have been discovered by means of
measurement with a common unit, or more radically, by its
position in an order .... The activity of the mind ... will therefore
no longer consist in drawing things together, in setting out on a
question for everything that might reveal some sort of kinship,
attract, or secretly shared nature within them, but, on the contrary,
in discriminating. 
5
John Locke, writing at the beginning of this period, makes a key
distinction between additive and subtractive processes:
For wit lying most in the assemblage of ideas, and putting those
together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any
resemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures and
agreeable visions in the fancy; judgment on the contrary, lies quite
on the other side, in separating carefully, one thing from another,
ideas wherein can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid
being misled by similitude[.]6
"Western reason is entering the age of judgment," says Foucault.7 We
will see how much this concept of judgment transformed theories of both
art and law.
The unity of the classical project in the English Enlightenment, across
so many different fields of endeavour, is truly remarkable.8 The English
intellectual elite was a small group, most of whom knew each other, and
often well. Sir Joshua Reynolds (1723-92) was one glue that held them
together. With Samuel Johnson he founded the Literary Club in 1764. It
was the beating heart of the English enlightenment; Reynolds was its
soul.9 Appopinted the first President of the Royal Academy of Art when it
was founded in 1768, he delivered an annual or biennial address for the
next 25 years. These Discourses on Art set out with accuracy and elegance
his vision of art in "the grand style," and advanced a broader thesis of the
relevance of aesthetics to social and political values.1l Reynolds self-
5. Id. at 55.
6. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, BOOK 2 [XI] 203 (Dover ed.,
1959).
7. FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 61.
8. LAWRENCE LIPKING, THE ORDERING OF THE ARTS IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND
(1970); JOHN BARRELL, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF PAINTING FROM REYNOLDS TO HAZLITT (1986).
Lipking's work, which appears a few years after Foucault's discussion of similar themes in French
intellectual history, but makes no mention of it, provides another striking example of scholarly
convergence.
9. On Reynolds's prominent role, see, for example, CHARLES ROBERT LESLIE & TOM TAYLOR,
LIFE AND TIMES OF SIR JOSHUA REYNOLDS WITH NOTICES OF SOME OF HIS CONTEMPORARIES, VOL. 1
228-29 (1865).
10. SIR JOSHUA REYNOLDS, DISCOURSES (Pat Rogers ed., 1992) [hereinafter referenced by
Discourse and page number] (originally published in THE WORKS OF SIR JOSHUA REYNOLDS, 2 VOLS.
(Edmund Malone ed., 1798)). The first seven discourses were first published in 1778.
[Vol. 28:2
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consciously absorbs the whole current of Enlightenment thought and
attempts to apply it to the realm of art. Certainly his lectures clearly reflect
the influence of Johnson and, later, of Edmund Burke.l" Indeed, some
have churlishly suggested that the discourses were really cobbled
together-even ghost-written-by the Club. 2 But there is no conspiracy
or plagiarism here. Reynolds's Discourses attempt to capture the intimate
intercourse between aesthetic, political, and philosophical considerations
in the middle and latter parts of the eighteenth century. He argued that true
art is not merely technical but conceptual; not interested in trivialities of
accurate representation and fetching ornament, but in the expression of
ideals. Indeed, Reynolds's Discourses continually oscillate between an
aesthetic and a political argument, not only in emphasizing the critical
distinction between whether painting was a "liberal art or [a] mechanical
trade,"13 but in drawing out the parallels between aesthetic and other forms
of judgment:
A man of real taste is always a man of judgment in other respects;
and those inventions which either disdain or shrink from reason are
generally, I fear, more like the dreams of a distempered brain than
the exalted enthusiasm of a sound and true genius. 
14
Reynolds marks a period in which the influence of art on society was
both deep and wide.15 Artistic production was self-consciously part and
parcel of the whole equipage of governance. It was typically conceived to
be an ally of the political and social establishment - a position that it
would thoroughly disavow in the nineteenth century. His Discourses are
not only a vital neoclassical text on the theory and nature of art. It is a
textbook on the aesthetic unity of knowledge, a primer in the strain of
civic humanism which dominated political thought.16
II. THE SHADES OF JUSTICE
Studies on the image of justice have mostly been concerned with the
figure's historical development and iconography. Legal scholars and art
historians have turned attention to chronological analysis, explored the
uses and display of images of justice in courthouses and other spaces, and
11. PAT ROGERS, Introduction to REYNOLDS, DISCOURSES, supra note 10, at 3-35.
12. WILLIAM BLAKE, ANNOTATIONS TO THE WORKS OF SIR JOSHUA REYNOLDS xliv, in THE
COMPLETE POETRY AND PROSE OF WILLIAM BLAKE 639 (David Erdman ed., 1982).
13. See, e.g., REYNOLDS,supra note 10, (III) at 103; (IV) at 116; see also BARRELL,supra note 8.
14. REYNOLDS, supra note 10, (VII); see LIPKING, supra note 8, at 398.
15. See BARRELL, supra note 8. Richard Wendorf, in his book on Reynolds's life and career,
examines the extent to which art and society converge in the figure of the portrait painter. As the
author explains, "complaisance," or the art of pleasing, played an important role in Reynolds's artistic
success: "the painter's temperament was suited or adapted to the society he 'captured' and in which he
thrived." RICHARD WENDORF, SIR JOSHUA REYNOLDS. THE PAINTER IN SOCIETY 21 (1996).
16. BARRELL, supra note 8; see also COSTAS DOUZINAS & RONNIE WARRINGTON, JUSTICE
MISCARRIED: ETHICS, AESTHETICS, AND THE LAW 265-309 (1994).
20161
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yet our historical understanding is still incomplete.17  A careful
examination of Reynolds's representation of Justice within the political
and legal thought of the Enlightenment, and its full significance in relation
to aesthetic and philosophical debates and art practices in eighteenth-
century England, constitute our main focus. In this section, we discuss the
unique attributes as well as the context in which Reynolds produced an
image of Justice that in its integration of legal and artistic theory
represents a real breakthrough in English painting. Indeed, as we will
show, the best guide to Reynolds's treatment of justice in this image lies
not by an analysis of legal or philosophical texts but in another of his
works of art.
In 1777, Reynolds was commissioned to design new stained glass
windows to replenish the gothic West Window at New College, Oxford.18
Rather than simply provide drawings from which the glass artist, Thomas
Jervais, could work, Reynolds chose to realize full paintings for a series of
the seven virtues, beneath a vast nativity scene.19 Ultimately, as Reynolds
himself conceded, the window was not entirely successful.2 ° The tonal
restraint that characterizes Reynolds's work, reflecting the neoclassical
preference for line over colour and form over effect, does not perfectly
suit the unfamiliar medium. The glass-work competes rather than
complements the gothic figuration of the chapel and the window.
Reynolds's diffuse brushwork becomes, in glass, over-simplified and
crude. The colours appear washed out. Indeed, the softer tones of Jervais
contrast with William Raphael Eginton's stained-glass reproduction of
Reynolds's Justice, which underlines her lit face and direct gaze and
evinces a sharper use of colour.21 Jervais does not render well the shadows
that are so important to Reynolds's Justice (second from right). As a
result, Lady Justice's face is brought into sharper relief than in the
original, like a cartoon, depriving it of its ideal quality, and making her
17. Prominent among them is PLEISTER & SCHILD, RECHT UND GERECHTIGKEIT IM SPIEGEL DER
EUROPAISCHEN KUNST (1988); SCHILD, BILDER VON RECHT UND GERECHTIGHEID (1995); JUDITH
RESNIK AND DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE (2012).
18. REYNOLDS 290-91 (Nicholas Penny ed., 1986); MARTIN POSTLE, The West Window of New
College Chapel, 423 APOLLO 51-52 (1997).
19. The picture of Justice is currently in the collection of the Earl of Normanton at his country
seat, Somerley, Ringwood, Hampshire. A note in John Thomas Smith's Nollekens and his
Times states: "The 'Virtues' for which Lord Normanton gave £5,565 at the sale of Lord Thomond's
pictures in 1821, are now at Somerley. Seven years later George IV was willing to give double this
sum for the set, but his offer and a later one of three times the sum by the Trustees of the National
Gallery were refused." JOHN T. SMITH, NOLLEKENS AND HIS TIMES: COMPREHENDING A LIFE OF THE
CELEBRATED SCULPTOR; AND MEMOIRS OF SEVERAL CONTEMPORARY ARTISTS, FROM THE TIME OF
ROUBILIAC, HOGARTH, AND REYNOLDS, TO THAT OF FUSELI, FLAXMAN, AND BLAKE, VOL. 2 231
(Wilfred Whitten ed., 1920).
20. MARTIN POSTLE, SIR JOSHUA REYNOLDS: THE SUBJECT PICTURES 184 (1995); REYNOLDS,
supra note 18; MARTIN POSTLE, The Subject Pictures, in DAVID MANNINGS, SIR JOSHUA REYNOLDS:
A COMPLETE CATALOGUE OF HIS PAINTINGS, 2 VOLS. 551 (2000).
21. Eginton's copy of Reynolds's work, now at the Birmingham Museum and Art Gallery, was
part of a set of six windows commissioned around 1816 by Sir Joseph Scott to decorate St. Margaret's
Church in Great Barr.
[Vol. 28:2
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look more like a child than a woman.
Figure 2: Thomas Jervais, Justice, 1779, Stained glass, West Window of
the Chapel, New College, Oxford, © Courtesy of the Warden and Scholars
of New College, Oxford / Bridgeman Images
2016]
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Fortunately, although several of the original paintings on which the
West Window figures were based have been lost or destroyed over the
years, Fortitude and Justice remain. Justice stands out for the unorthodoxy
of its conception and the brilliance of its execution.2 She stands against a
stormy sky, a sword in her right hand, scales in her left. These were two of
the traditional symbols of justice as described in Cesare Ripa's
Iconology,23 an English translation of which was published in 1779 by the
Scottish architect George Richardson. The translator's preface commends
the science of Iconology as a "useful and entertaining" repertory of
"representations and symbols, which by an ingenious modification, [the
artist] might happily apply to the subjects he should have occasion to
treat."24  Richardson's publication boasted an impressive list of
subscribers, including Reynolds, who was at that very moment engaged in
applying "ingenious modifications ,25 of his own to Justice and the other
Virtues.
Indeed, the treatment of the theme was already unusual. As noted by the
author of An Inquiry into the Requisite Cultivation and Present State of the
Arts of Design in England, "the walls of our palaces have been, from the
period of the Reformation, successively covered with the work of foreign
artists. Holbein, Rubens, Vandyck, Lely, Kneller, nay [sic], Verrio,
Gennari, and La Guerre, have by turns enjoyed the numerous favours of
Sovereigns, adorned the halls and filled the cabinets of the nobles."2 6 Yet,
as Alexander S. Gourlay observed, "the class that controlled English
courts of law had so far been the least interested in paintings.,
27
Of course, Reynolds's work was not without precursors. In the 1720s,
Sir James Thornhill painted the ceiling of the Aldermen's Court Room,
Guildhall, showing the City of London personified, surrounded by
Prudence, Justice, Temperance, and Fortitude. The work included an
overmantel piece, now destroyed, showing Justice embracing Mercy with
Liberty, Piety, and Truth.28 Two decades later, in the late 1740s, the
22. See POSTLE, supra note 20, MANNINGS, supra note 20.
23. CESARE RIPA, ICONOLOGIA (printed initially without illustrations in 1593 and then reprinted
with illustrations in 1603; Dover reprint ed., 1976).
24. GEORGE RICHARDSON, ICONOLOGY; OR, A COLLECTION OF EMBLEMATICAL FIGURES,
CONTAINING FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FOUR REMARKABLE SUBJECTS, MORAL AND
INSTRUCTIVE (1779).
25. Id.
26. PRINCE HOARE, AN INQUIRY INTO THE REQUISITE CULTIVATION AND PRESENT STATE OF THE
ARTS OF DESIGN IN ENGLAND 216 (1806). In the early 1700s, for example, the Italian painter Antonio
Verrio created a large ceiling painting representing Queen Ann as Justice for the Queen's room in
Hampton Court Place, but it may be safely stated that England lacked a tradition of justice pictures.
BRETT DOLMAN, Antonio Verrio (c. 1636-1707) and the Royal Image at Hampton Court, THE BRITISH
ART JOURNAL 18-28 (2009).
27. ALEXANDER S. GOURLAY, Hogarth, Rubens, and the 'Justice-Picture' Tradition, 14(1) n.s.
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY LIFE 38 (Feb. 1990).
28. SIR JAMES THORNHILL OF DORSET, 1675-1734: CATALOGUE OF THE TERCENTENARY
EXHIBITION HELD AT THE DORSET COUNTY MUSEUM, DORCHESTER (1975).
[Vol. 28:2
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English painter Francis Hayman produced an allegorical study
representing Prince Frederick and Princess Augusta for the rotunda at
Vauxhall Gardens. The royal couple are surrounded by three female
figures representing Justice (holding a sword), Truth (holding a mirror)
and Britannia (holding a shield). The painter and engraver, William
Hogarth-Thornhill's son-in-law-also represented the theme of justice in
Paul Before Felix, a work he retouched and which exists in various
versions.29 In 1747, following the recommendation of Lord Mansfield, he
was engaged by the Society of Lincoln's Inn to paint a picture to decorate
the Chapel of the Society, later placed in the Great Hall that served as a
court of law. The picture, produced in the grand manner and illustrating a
Biblical scene, represents the legendary trial of Paul. Hogarth's
controversial choice of subject reflected his critical view of justice and
raised troubling questions about the judicial process and the impartiality of
judges. A carved figure of justice holding the scales in the foreground can
also be seen, for example, in Hogarth's representation of the interior of a
law office in his print Hudibras and the Lawyer (1726). The unmistakable
figure of justice is outlined against the large collection of books and legal
documents on the shelves. Situated slightly higher and in front of the
comfortably seated lawyer and his two clerks, it is a reminder of how they
must act and carry out justice. Similarly, a drawing by Hayman, for the
illustrated volume of Edward Moore's Fables for the Female Sex (1744),
represents a dazed lawyer confronted by justice. The scene takes place in
an office, illuminated by candlelight, where justice has suddenly emerged
from a big, nebulous cloud.
But Sir Joshua Reynolds's Justice offers a far more ambitious treatment
of legal themes. In the painted version in particular, Reynolds achieves a
synthesis of legal and artistic theory, a practical demonstration of his
theoretical Discourses, that marks a real watershed in English painting. Of
the innovative elements of the painting, let us note to begin with his
radical departure from traditional representations of justice, which after
the sixteenth century was usually represented blindfolded in order to
convey its impartiality.3" On the contrary, Justice's open eyes gaze out at
the world; "the shadow from the arm falls upon the upper part of the face,
and preserves the idea of the character without depicting her blind."31
Various interpretations of this highly unusual choice are possible.
Nicholas Penny concludes that "the point of the blindfold was that justice
29. See CLOVIS WHITFIELD, William Hogarth's 'Paul before Felix' at Lincoln's Inn, 113
BURLINGTON MAGAZINE 210-14 (April 1971); RONALD PAULSON, HOGARTH: ART AND POLITICS,
1750-1764. VOL. 3 (1993).
30. COSTAS DOUZINAS, Prosopon and Antiprosopon: Prolegomena for a Legal Iconology, in
LAW AND THE IMAGE. THE AUTHORITY OF ART AND THE AESTHETICS OF LAW 53 (Costas Douzinas
& Lynda Nead eds., 1999).
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was unswayed by superficial evidence: Reynolds indicates that she has
eyes only for the balance."32 But Justice is not looking at the balance at
all, rather past and through it, to something else. Judith Resnik and Dennis
Curtis offer instead a smorgasbord of possibilities:
The gesture could be protective-as if to maintain balance, Justice
needed to insulate herself from the glare of the sun. One could also
read her raised arm and balance as authoritative, indicating the
power to decide what light ... ought to be brought before her. Or
Justice's stance could be seen as putting her in a quizzical posture,
requiring her to peer out to decipher what comes before her eyes.
33
But none of these alternatives suffices. "Protective" does not capture the
mood of her pose; "authoritative," for the same reason, seems to convey
quite the wrong affect. "Quizzical" is closer to the mark, but overall, her
hands shade her eyes not in an expression of puzzlement but rather-it
seems to us-as a confident aid in achieving clarity.
None of these explanatory words adequately reflects on the kind of
familiar gesture that Justice deploys, or on exactly what we use such a
gesture for. The best clue to the interpretation of the image lies in
Reynolds's first self-portrait, from 1747-49.34 Here too, the artist is shown
staring into the distance, shading his eyes against the brightness of the
light. A direct transposition of the hand over the eyes, an "attitude" which
James Northcote noted "is often chosen by painters when they paint their
own portraits,"35 can be seen in George Richmond's later Self-Portrait
(1840, Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge), where the contrast of light and
shadow, evocative of Rembrandt's technique, imparts a psychological
drama to the work. Perhaps there is something "quizzical" about
Reynolds's portrait; a flicker of doubt creases his brow. But here too, the
artist portrays shaded vision as a sign of his confident and discriminating
gaze. The hand framing the face and casting a band of shadow that frames
the eyes shows the artist directing his contemplation and disciplining his
representation. Reynolds presents himself to us in the dual role of seeing
and being seen.3 6 With the portrait in mind, the figure of Justice is
32. REYNOLDS, supra note 18, at 291.
33. JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE 99 (2012).
34. See MANNINGS, supra note 20, at 46-47; CHARLES CRAMER, ABSTRACTION AND THE
CLASSICAL IDEAL 53-54 (2006).
35. See JAMES NORTHCOTE, THE LIFE OF SIR JOSHUA REYNOLDS, VOL. 1 304 (1818).
36. In the Nativity scene, placed above the virtues in the New College chapel, it is worth noting
that St. Joseph, like Justice, is represented looking out at the spectator, a choice condemned by one
critic: "except in ludicrous subjects, none of the personages of the picture ought to be represented as
looking out of it - his Nativity, therefore, according to this rule, is a ludicrous subject, as Joseph is
looking at the spectator, and pointing to the infant." Reynolds's pupil James Northcote, however,
commented that "the critic does not seem to understand the strict propriety of this action," explaining
that "Joseph is not to point out the holy child to those persons represented in the picture, who are
supposed to come prepared to adore it" adding that he "looks out of the picture on the world, and
directs them to behold their Redeemer." JAMES NORTHCOTE, THE LIFE OF SIR JOSHUA REYNOLDS,
VOL. II 109 (1818).
[Vol. 28:2
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revealed not only as the counterpart of the artist, but as engaged in a
similar exercise of precision and judgment. The portrait very clearly helps
us understand both the meaning he intended by the gesture, and the
aesthetic parallel that he was drawing.
Figure 3: Sir Joshua Reynolds, Self-Portrait Shading the Eyes, c. 1747-49,
Oil on canvas, 63 x 74 cm, National Portrait Gallery, London. © National
Portrait Gallery, London
"A man of real taste is always a man of judgment in other respects,"37 he
writes.
Like a sovereign judge and arbiter of art, he is possessed of that
presiding power which separates and attracts every excellence
from every school; selects both from what is great, and what is
little; brings home knowledge from the East and from the West;
making the universe tributary towards furnishing his mind, and
enriching his works with originality and variety of inventions.
38
Significantly, the ability to make an informed judgment in matters of art
was a prerogative of men. Women were not considered cultivated or
experienced in the appreciation of pictures. So too, connoisseurship was a
male-dominated pursuit during the eighteenth century.39  Yet the
embodiment of Justice as feminine (only a few male personifications
37. REYNOLDS, supra note 10, (VI) at 202.
38. Id. (VI) at 170.
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exist), contrasts sharply with the representation of Judgement
"allegorically expressed by the figure of an old man," as noted in
Richardson's lconology.
40
Indeed, in both his art and his writings, Reynolds consistently entwined
legal and artistic judgment. Nathaniel Hone's Sketch for the Conjuror
(Tate Britain, London), rejected for the 1775 Royal Academy Exhibition,
satirizes Reynolds as a wizard, his maulstick transformed into a wand,
with a collection of old master prints, an opened book, and an owl.
Tellingly, the sketch of a justice scale rests at his feet. In his eighth
Discourse, delivered the same year that he was painting Justice, Reynolds
declared that, "an artist is obliged for ever to hold a balance in his hand,
by which he must determine the value of different qualities; that, when
some fault must be committed, he may choose the least."
41
For Reynolds, the painter must "preside like a supreme judge, over all
the productions of nature.4 2 A great artist works like a lawyer: "Great
lawyers call the leading points in a case, or the leading cases relative to
those points. The details of particulars, which does not assist the
expression of the main characteristic, is worse than useless, it is
mischievous, as it dissipates the attention.4 3 This is no mere metaphor.
Reynolds's argument is that the artist both edifies the public through his
conception, and trains them in the practice of reasoned judgment.
Likewise, and equally importantly, the lawyer undertakes the role of artist
whose task is to paint a picture in the brightest light for all to see. His art
is indeed an art of judgment, arrangement and design.
III. ABSTRACTION AND EMBODIMENT
Our objective in the present section is to discuss the extent to which
Reynolds's representation of justice revolved around key theoretical issues
and, in particular, how the tension between abstraction and particularity, to
which Reynolds alludes, and which runs through Enlightenment thought,
permeates his interpretation of Justice.' Furthermore, our argument is that
the image of Justice marks a shift in Reynolds's view and moreover, a
shift in which his practical experience as a portrait painter was
fundamentally implicated. Again then, Reynolds embodies in his own
person not the separation of art and law or art and philosophy but on the
contrary, an on-going and dynamic discourse between them; in which art
proved itself capable of informing our thinking about law and not just the
other way around.
40. RICHARDSON, supra note 24, at 97.
41. REYNOLDS, supra note 10, (VIII) at 222.
42. Id. (1II) at 106.
43. Id. (XI) at 249.
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As a rule, the neoclassical quest for purity and simplicity privileged
generalization as a mode of thought. "The business of a poet," writes
Samuel Johnson, "is to examine not the individual, but the species: to
remark general properties and large appearances: he does not number the
streaks of the tulip ... and must neglect the minuter discriminations which
one may have remarked and another have neglected."' 5 Reynolds was
quick to disparage mere "mechanical" artists, whose art pursued a
meticulous realism. He dismisses, with the arch-epithet "Gothic," art
which merely "attends to the minute accidental discriminations of
particular and individual objects."46 It was on these grounds that his friend
Thomas Warton celebrated Reynolds's painted window:
Thy powerful hand has broke the Gothic chain,
And brought my bosom back to truth again.47
Reynolds in his theoretical work favours the "universal" over the
"capricious" and "fashionable." The best art, Reynolds insisted, does not
reside in details but expresses the general conception of an ideal. "Perfect
form," he said, "is produced by leaving out particularities, and retaining
only general ideas .... The general idea constitutes real excellence.'48 It is
only the "inferior style that marks the variety of stuffs. ' 4 9 The
distinguishing marks of a particular tree are for Reynolds "deformities"
that detract us from our pursuit of ideal form. Even the art of portraiture,
the genre he made his own, should not aspire to merely the "capturing of a
likeness."5 Rather than an exact imitation of the real world, the artist
should instead draw out the general type and ideal that the sitter will
exemplify.
In the Discourses, Reynolds's argument for abstraction and
generalization is made, at one point, using a strikingly visual metaphor. He
commends:
the habit of looking upon objects at large, and observing the effect
which they have on the eye when it is dilated, and employed upon
the whole, without seeing any one of the parts distinctly. It is by
this that we obtain the ruling characteristic .... Great fame does
not proceed from works being more highly finished than those of
other artists, but from that enlarged comprehension which sees the
whole object at once.5"
45. See BARRELL, supra note 8, at 91.
46. REYNOLDS, supra note 10, (I) at 81; see also id. (IV) at 128.
47. THOMAS WARTON, VERSES ON SIR JOSHUA REYNOLDS'S PAINTED WINDOW AT NEW
COLLEGE, OXFORD (1782) (cited in NORTHCOTE, supra note 35, VOL. II at 108).
48. REYNOLDS, supra note 10, (IV) at 116.
49. Id. (IV) at 122
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Charles Cramer connects dilated vision to the shaded eyes in Reynolds's
self-portrait, and thence to the figure of Justice. He argues that what is
being depicted here is 'the ability of judgment to weigh that empirical
evidence based on broad universal principles rather than minute,
circumstantial details, just as the generalizing artist, with "dilated" vision,
sizes up and sorts perceived objects without becoming lost in the welter of
adventitious contingencies.52
But this is not why we shade our eyes. Cramer refers to "squinting or
dilating the vision," but these are surely opposites. Squinting - and the
Reynolds self-portrait does appear to be squinting - does not dilate the
pupils, but contracts them, in order to limit the amount of light (or change
the shape of the lens), which under bright conditions provides an excess of
visual information. Shading the eyes performs the same function. It
eliminates glare, precisely in order to allow us to select and focus our
vision better. Again, what is important here is how the artist's practical
and aesthetic understanding not only seeps into his thinking about the
philosophical theme, but puts real pressure on the theoretical tension
between abstraction and particularity, turning his representation in new
directions, and nuancing the more dogmatic position taken in his
theoretical writing. In a portrait above all, as Reynolds well knew,
judicious behavior demanded the consideration of particulars. As Nikolaus
Pevsner argues, "If you are biased by principles, or preconceived notions,
or prejudice, you cannot judge objectively."53 Samuel Johnson, likewise,
attacked the "shallow" critic or connoisseur, "who judges only by narrow
rules, and those too often false, and which, tho' they should be true, and
founded on nature, will lead him but a very little way towards the just
estimation of the sublime beauties in works of Genius."
54
So the self-portrait does not show Reynolds striving towards a broader
outline, but a sharper image. The eye is not generalizing but, as John
Locke put it, discriminating - exercising judgment. Justice does the same
thing. She, too, is not shading her eyes simply to see a general whole.
Instead, she expresses the artist's commitment to a more precise
discrimination. Indeed, in this respect the innovative position taken by
Reynolds's Justice runs counter to a traditional relationship between light
and justice that extends all the way from the Egyptian god Shamash-one
thousand years before Hammurabi-via Apollo, to Christian figures such
as Sol Justitiae.55 In the age of absolute sovereignty the sun was
52. CRAMER, supra note 34, at 53.
53. NIKOLAUS PEVSNER, THE ENGLISHNESS OF ENGLISH ART: AN EXPANDED AND ANNOTATED
VERSION OF THE REITH LECTURES 67 (1978).
54. SAMUEL JOHNSON, The Idler, No. 76 (Sept. 29, 1759) in THE WORKS OF SAMUEL JOHNSON
176 (Arthur Murphy ed., 1825).
55. See DESMOND MANDERSON, Metastases of Myth: Legal Images as Transitional Objects, 26
LAW AND CRITIQUE 207-23 (2015); see also PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL EMBLEMS AND THE ART OF
LAW (2014); GENEALOGIES OF LEGAL VISION (Peter Goodrich & Valerie Hayaert eds., 2015).
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transmuted into a figure of kingly authority, most notably in Louis XIV's
megalomaniacal iconography.56 Any similar fantasies the English royal
family might have nourished had been quashed in 1689. Reynolds's
Justice, on the contrary, represents light not as the emanation of justice,
but an impediment to it. Justice uses the scales to shut out the light,
limiting its excessive information in order to allow her faculty of
discrimination to operate. By representing light against justice, as an
excess or distraction, Reynolds draws us resolutely away from ideas of
transcendence, authority, or divinity, and towards the human skill
requiring all the composure and concentration of a craftsman's practice.
As opposed to the abstraction and neutrality of "blind justice," Reynolds
emphasizes that the process of discernment is a matter of judgment to be
performed by the judge herself, as part of her wisdom and in each and
every decision. Her blindness is not absolute. She chooses not to see, the
better to see what she chooses.
MH
Figure 4: Joshua Reynolds, Theory, 1779-80, Oil on canvas, 172.7 x 172.2
cm, © Courtesy of the Royal Academy of Arts, London.
We can understand the painting therefore as taking issue with some of
his own assertions in the Discourses, reflecting a more subtle balance
between universal and particular. This conceptual shift was given
powerful impetus by his own practical insight. Throughout Reynolds's
work-in his portraits most especially-the notion of abstraction is
constantly tempered by the compelling human embodiment of his
figures.7 But, in relation to the subject pictures in particular, Justice might
56. See, e.g., PETER BURKE, THE FABRICATION OF Louis XIV (1994).
57. See in particular discussions in REYNOLDS, supra note 19; MANNINGS, supra note 20; and
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be thought to mark a conscious decision by Reynolds to move away from
more generalized conceptions. The contrast with the ceiling painting of
Theory produced for the 1780 opening of the Royal Academy's first
premises, in Somerset House, is striking. The figure of Theory is ethereal,
not grounded. She is described by one 1780 reviewer as "sitting in a cloud,
darting her eye through the expanse .... This piece possesses a most
beautiful lightness, and the figure seems rather to hover in the air, than to
have any settled feat.",5 8 The painting's two strong diagonals draw the
corners of the room in upon her figure, representing the importance-both
aesthetic and intellectual-of this upward aspiration away from the world
and towards the giddy heights of abstraction. She holds a compass in one
hand, and in the other a scroll inscribed with the words: "THEORY is the
knowledge of what is truly NATURE." Thus while the compass
acknowledges the importance of measuring and accurately observing
nature, this science is in the service of a theoretical inquiry, to be pursued
by reason and idealism. The contrast between the two female figures of
Theory and Justice highlights this tension between the general (Plato) and
the particular (Aristotle) in Reynolds's art. Justice, unlike Theory, has her
bare feet firmly on the ground. Theory's hair flies away upwards while
that of Justice is divided into equal parts. Theory's open pose and
contemplative eyes search out the heavens; Justice's measured pose and
fixed gaze directly address the viewer.
If we return to what is characteristic and distinctive about Reynolds's
treatment of Justice, it is her highly particular and natural embodiment that
arrests our gaze. We are immediately confronted by the intimacy and
embodied sensuality - the qualities of humanity and femininity - in her
address. Facing the viewer, Justice is dressed in plain salmon-pink robes
and brought up close to the picture plane, one of her feet shown peeping
out from beneath the dress. Never before had she been represented quite
so explicitly in her facial and bodily address to the spectator. Like
Catherine, Lady Bampfylde (1776-7, Tate Britain), she wears a flowing
ribbon that envelops her forearm and delicate silhouette. In a manner
reminiscent of the female full-length portraits that he exhibited in the
1770s, Reynolds's painting affords a striking example of the "Historical
Style" praised in his fifth Discourse of 1772.'9 Her strong nose and fine
neckline, untainted by the love of vanity or luxury, endows the figure with
the "simplicity of the antique air and attitude.,'60 The unadorned hair,
coiffed in equal parts on each side, further endows the image with a
classical symmetry and simplicity. Yet her wide eyes, sharply-defined
chin and the full curve of her lips convey a desirable woman. In thus
POSTLE, supra note 20.
58. ROYAL ACADEMY CRITIQUES &C, ROYAL ACADEMY ARCHIVES VOL. 1 81 (1780).
59. REYNOLDS, supra note 10, (V) at 149.
60. Id. (V) at 153.
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balancing the modem and the antique, the elegant and the seductive, the
conventional and the imaginary-the portrait and the virtue-Reynolds
endeavours as always "to conciliate fashion with beauty."61
The intimate physicality of the figure of Justice marks a profound turn
from imagining justice as an abstract ideal, to one capable of human
realization, even of eliciting human desire. This concern for the realization
and embodiment of virtue was typical of the neoclassical world view.
62
Hence the profound shift from allegory to personification. Neoclassicism
had little time for the Renaissance obsession with ciphers, signs, or
signals. The emblem literature, sophisticated but disembodied, was dying
out. Richardson's Iconology turned out to be not only the first, but the last
English translation of Ripa. Instead, Reynolds offers up scene after scene
of men and women dressed up as heroes or in the costume of allegorical
figures, acting out their ideals in everyday lives. Justice, in her own way,
is another such personification-not a symbol but a real person, whose
dress and attributes suggest she is inhabiting an ideal and bringing it to life
in her daily practice. Indicative of this transformation are her slim and
finely rendered scales as well as the attenuated, linear and razor-thin
sword that fuses in similar colours with her body. As Pevsner points out,
Reynolds "painted portraits and not mythology and saints,"63 all the while
exploring "a variety of visual possibilities and cultural references, both
classical and non-classical."' Justice likewise, while posed in classical
costume and posture, offers facial features and a sensual embodiment that
derive from Reynolds's sensitivity as a portrait painter.
So too, like Reynolds's portraits more generally, the figure of Justice is
strikingly dynamic in composition. In contrast with the staunch stability,
legs apart and anns akimbo, of the portrait of Fortitude (1778-79, Private
collection), Reynolds depicts Justice in a life-like contrapposto stance,
one leg straight and the other slightly bent at the knee. In a pose that
affirms the decorum and dignity of his classical subject, Justice is neither
walking nor standing but poised for action. This fine balance between
composure and alertness establishes her constant disposition to judge, and
cleverly underlines the message of the scales she holds. Early critics
accused Reynolds of showing the scales off-kilter, in a manner "repugnant
to the ancients' idea of justice.' '65 On the contrary, Reynolds
communicates their sensitivity and precision. Justice is presented as
literally a "balancing act"-an effort, an almost physical attentiveness that
must be constantly adjusted, rather than merely a fact or a natural kind or a
disembodied aspiration. As do so many of his portraits and subject
61. LESLIE & TAYLOR, supra note 9, VOL. 2 at 273.
62. See discussions in BATE, supra note 44; HUGH HONOUR, NEO-CLASSICISM (1968);
NEOCLASSICISM AND ROMANTICISM 1750-1850, 2 VOLS. (Lorenz Eitner ed., 1971).
63. PEVSNER, supra note 53, at 65.
64. MARK HALLETT, REYNOLDS: PORTRAITURE IN ACTION 114 (2014).
65. THE MORNING POST, May 2, 1780, as quoted in MANNINGS, supra note 20, at 551.
2016]
17
Manderson and Martinez: Justice and Art, Face to Face
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
pictures, Reynolds invites us to understand virtue as a living practice, a
performative and constitutive act.
The scales of justice themselves demonstrate Reynolds's ability to
imagine his figures in a social context as well as a physical one. In a
somewhat backhanded compliment, the painting, which was exhibited in
the Royal Academy in 1780, was adjudged "an astounding mixture of
beauty, elegance and affectation.., but the emblems and the disposition
of them are suggested by the taste of a Petit-Maitre."66 Martin Postle
points out that the reproach was likely in reference "to the scales held by
Justice, which were modelled upon those used in contemporary commerce
rather than the scale-pans found in traditional iconography.' 6 7 The
Morning Post compared her to "the wife of a butcher weighing out a leg of
mutton to his dainty customer.'" 68 Yet the everyday familiarity of such
scales surely evokes the mundane human practice of measurement and
calculation at the heart of "the age of judgment." Neither should the way
in which Reynolds translates normative values into a modem commercial
society surprise us. He developed a profitable portrait business but
warned in the ninth Discourse, delivered in 1780, that "[t]rade and its
consequential riches must be acknowledged to give the means; but a
people whose whole attention is absorbed in those means, and who forget
the end, can aspire but little above the rank or a barbarous nation.
69
Justice, caught in two different worlds, evokes Reynolds's effort to
balance political and professional concerns. As President of the Royal
Academy, Reynolds advocated the formal teaching of art and the
importance of rules; but as a practising artist he was equally determined to
explore new compositions and artistic methods. The figure of Justice is
modified and shaped by both sides of his character and his work. Justice,
under the imperative of these dual pressures, ceases to be an abstract trope
and truly comes to life.
IV. JUST IN TIME
Reynolds's neo-classicism reflected a distinctive conception of the
relationship between past, present, and future, and this temporality also
modifies the figure of Justice he described. Reynolds's attitude towards
the past provides us with a vital point of comparison with the work of Sir
William Blackstone. He too, shaped in a similar fashion by the powerful
ideologies and assumptions of the neoclassical age, develops a treatment
of the common law which was both a radical departure from previous
work and a text that was to dominate generations of legal thinkers. On the
one hand, our study of Reynolds allows us to see how much Blackstone's
66. St James Chronicle, April 29, 1780, as quoted in id. at 551.
67. MARTIN POSTLE, The subject pictures, in MANNINGS, supra note 20, at 551.
68. THE MORNING POST, supra note 65, as quoted in MANNINGS, supra note 20, at 551.
69. REYNOLDS, supra note 10, (IX) at 229.
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work was shaped by and reflected the intellectual, including the aesthetic,
climate of the age. On the other hand, it leads us to conclude that if
Reynolds became a jurist, in and through his art, so too Blackstone was an
artist, in and through his jurisprudence.
Returning to Reynolds' meditation on fame, judgment and the future in
his self-portrait, we do not shade our eyes to see broader, but further. The
very act communicates distance. In the case of the early self-portrait it is
easy to see this distance as an expression of Reynolds's ambition. Entirely
in keeping with the tenor of the times, he saw the pursuit of fame not as a
vice but a virtue. Fame was not merely worldly success. Rather, it looked
towards immortality, a way of testing our lasting worth. "Without the love
of fame," he advised the Academy's students, "you can never do anything
excellent.' 71 Above all, fame imports time into judgment. The person who
is driven by fame does not live in the present, but in the past against which
he measures himself, and in the future that will recognize him. In this
sense it can be contrasted with the emerging culture of celebrity. Celebrity
is transitory, superficial, and commodified; fame is permanent, essential,
and virtuous. Reynolds's youthful self-portrait is a portrait of the artist as a
young man, fixed intently on the distance, which is to say on the future
that awaits him.72
This idea of looking into the future was articulated by Titian in his
renowned painting of the Allegory of Prudence (1550-65, National
Gallery, London). The picture, believed to be a self-portrait of the artist,
represents the heads of three men juxtaposed to the heads of three animals
each facing opposite directions. Titian epitomizes age and visually
articulates man's need to assess judiciously the relationship of the past and
present to the future. This meaning is suggested by the Latin inscription:
"from the past, the present acts prudently, lest it spoil future action."73
Prudence, gained by experience and associated with foresight and
judgment, was a notion of great significance in Renaissance art theory and
rhetoric.7 4 Every portrait, like any judicial decision, is a form of prudence.
The prudent artist, like the prudent lawyer, proceeds according to his past
experience in order to profess good judgment in the present.
Such temporal complexity infused eighteenth century thought.
"Whatever withdraws us from the power of our senses," wrote Johnson,
"whatever makes the past, the distant or the future predominate over the
present advances us in the dignity of thinking beings.' 75 In Renaissance
70. JOSHUA REYNOLDS - THE CREATION OF CELEBRITY 17-22 (Martin Postle ed., 2005).
71. REYNOLDS, supra note 10, (V) at 149.
72. See CRISTINA S. MARTINEZ, Self-Portraits, in SIR JOSHUA REYNOLDS. THE ACQUISITION OF
GENIUS 96-100 (Sam Smiles ed., 2009).
73. ERWIN PANOFSKY, Titian's Allegory of Prudence: A Postscript, in ERWIN PANOFSKY,
MEANING IN THE VISUAL ARTS 181-205 (1970).
74. See DAVID SUMMERS, THE JUDGEMENT OF SENSE. RENAISSANCE NATURALISM AND THE RISE
OF AESTHETICS 266-82 (1987).
75. BARRELL, supra note 8, at 11.
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art, for example Van Eyck's Madonna of Chancellor Rolin (c. 1435,
Musie du Louvre), multiple temporalities were commonly mixed in a
single canvas-patrons or contemporary figures were painted into
religious or historical scenes, and figures from ancient times were shown
in modern dress. But where Reynolds places'his models in ancient or
mythological scenes, they have not been somehow transported through
time. They are typically shown acting a part, evoking a history that must
be consciously revived. They are conscious of the past but entirely
anchored in the present; it is the very existence of this temporal gap that
creates the normative demands that the present experiences as a mandate,
an injunction, or a vision - above all, as a call to judgment. The past is
constantly being judged as the future will judge us.
What does it mean to conceive of justice as a crossroads in time? In
earlier periods, the question was hardly raised. There, justice was thought
of as absolute and unique. Each instance was its own crisis-the Greek
krisis, after all, whether medical or juridical, marked the moment of
truth.76 The judgment of Solomon was unique-a singular strategy to
disclose a single truth. The justice of Christ is also unique-He is not
subject to rules or doctrines, precedents or quotas. The Last Judgment,
which affects all of us, is in no way comparative. What is due to us is
wholly a function of our own particular merits or demerits.
Reynolds's Justice shades her eyes and looks into the distance. The
discrimination she practices, then, is not concerned with a wilderness of
instances: she is seeking out patterns and comparisons. In temporal terms,
her judgment is influenced by both the past and the future, by its tradition
and its consequences. The same message is conveyed by the scales she
holds. Measurement, too, implies a selective comparison of various
different cases. The common law, said Sir Edward Coke, is "the
golden metewand [ruler] and measure to try the causes of the subjects."77
Understanding her role diachronically takes justice out of the realm of the
singular and propels it into the sphere of the universal. This tension
between the singular and the universal, between this decision here and
those decisions there, measuring justice for this person against justice for
many other persons at many other times, has always been a critical
question for the practice of judgment. Justice is not in modern dress. She
inhabits one of those purer, simpler times that the century so adored. But
from the past she looks forward to the future. By portraying Justice as the
diachronic embodiment of human judgment-engaged in comparison,
discrimination and measurement against a temporal horizon-Reynolds
articulates the distinctive tightrope it would henceforth walk.
76. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, JESUS AND PILATE 51-58 (2015).
77. SIR EDWARD COKE, Prohibitions del Roy, in THE STUART CONSTITUTION, DOCUMENTS AND
COMMENTARY 81 (J.P. Kenyon ed., 1986).
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In other words, Reynolds's Justice is not who she is but what she is
searching for. Her gaze remains intently focused on a "perfection, which
is dimly seen, at a great though not hopeless distance, and which we must
always follow because we never can attain."78 The virtue of justice is not
divine but human, not a person or a thing but a quest. The fact that it will
never be attained does not diminish, but ennobles, our practices. What
rescues Reynolds's art from the stalely repetitive, the dogmatic, and the
conformist fate of much late classical art, is that central feature of
neoclassicism-judgment. Judgment is the constant standard of critique
that Reynolds uses to evaluate all his predecessors, and to measure his
own work. This practice of judgment and discrimination gave
neoclassicism its rigour and its nobility of purpose-in philosophy, in art,
in literature, in criticism, and so on. In particular, the practice of judgment
tempered abstract principles by reference to the changeable and specific
contexts of human societies and experiences.
Perhaps above all, what Justice sees in the distance is none other than
the artist himself. We can imagine these two images not side by side, but
face to face. The painter looks out, and virtue returns his gaze. This
encounter takes place across time as well as space. Reynolds's Self-
portrait, Shading the Eyes, shows a young man intent on conquering the
world. He looks forward to the future. Justice looks out from the past,
measuring him as she measures herself, against the highest standards.
Perhaps what creases his brow, across that unbridgeable divide, is her
scrutiny. Each looks at or for the other, conscious of the burden of past
and future on the techniques of description and measurement hey practice
in the present. The encounter of those two gazes-justice and art-turns
the practice of judgment from something which is merely rote and
ideological into something which is self-questioning and critical. It turns
paint into art and, occasionally, transmutes law into justice.
Ironically, then, Reynolds's art provides a perfect example of the
inductive reasoning of the common law. Reynolds was frequently accused
of plagiarism, and attacked for his pastiches of the old masters. The Irish
painter Nathaniel Hone, in "a cleverly constructed satirical attack,"
mocked Reynolds's "extensive use of the thinly disguised figure"79 of the
old beggar in his Sketch for the Conjuror (1775). These criticisms echo, of
course, the accusation that legal precedent was nothing but the mindless
reiteration of the, past. But the best of Reynolds's paintings go beyond a
merely "servile" imitation (a term he frequently employed)80 creating
78. REYNOLDS, supra note 10, (V) at 230; see LIPKING, supra note 8, at 189-206.
79. POSTLE, supra note 20, at 134.
80. REYNOLDS, supra note 10, (1) at 86; (VI) at 153, 164; (XII) at 264; (XIII) at 290. See in
particular ANNE-PASCALE BRUNEAU, Tradition and the 'English School': Reading Reynolds's
Discourses, 57.1 BULLETIN DE LA SOCIETE D'ETUDES ANGLO-AMERICAINES DES XVIIE ET XVIIIE
SIECLES 25-36, at 30 (2003); Edgar Wind, 'Borrowed Attitudes' in Reynolds and Hogarth, 182
JOURNAL OF THE WARBURG INST. at 182-185 (1938); E.H. GOMBRICH, Reynolds's Theory and
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instead a genuine dialogue with his exemplars. As we have observed in the
relationship between Justice and the Self-portrait, Reynolds's allusions
and resonances, often intricately developed, suggest a notion of precedent
which relates judgment to tradition without abandoning its capacity for
development and responsiveness. The exercise of judgment demands that
we reflect on ourselves in our difference as well as our sameness from the
past.
This fluid ideal of precedent as "an argument through time"81 was
powerfully embodied in Reynolds's feminine Justice and in its elegant
contrapposto f neoclassical ideals. Just in time. For at the same moment,
particularly in the work of Sir William Blackstone, the English common
law was itself starting to be clarified and articulated with greater
coherence and eloquence than ever before.82 English law had shown little
interest in systematic and conceptual ordering. It was a congeries of
specific instances governed by obscure forms of action, highly technical
writs, and a kind of anecdotal memory that lawyers imbibed rather than
learned. In a remarkable and surprising development, he four volumes of
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England succeeded in
introducing into popular consciousness an idea of the common law quite at
odds with its reputation (and arguably its reality), transforming its
disparate and conceptually eclectic fragments into a coherent tradition-an
image of the law which for 250 years has not been dislodged. Blackstone
too was not intending simply to "describe the law" in meticulous detail; he
was not, in Reynolds's disparaging words, a "high finisher of the Dutch
school."83 No, he too was committed to an ideal neoclassical form:
showing "connexions" and appealing to the imagination, he presented law
as a set of substantive norms and principles worthy of our emulation, but
without succumbing to the imprisonment of purely abstract legal
principles, or the "servile" repetition of legal cases. In England, as Hegel
stated, "the common interest is concrete... render[ing] a general system
impossible.... [A]bstract and general principles have no attraction for
Englishmen."8 4 Blackstone turned law into a matter of viewing. Like a
portrait, or likeness, not always adhering to the strictly factual but
reaching towards the aspirational, law as it emerged in the Commentaries
eschews a simple description of the current state of the law, seeking its
purpose instead in an idealism to which the actual law tends but does not
reach. In attempting to unify juristic principles with art, style, and law,
Blackstone's portrait of the common law can be best understood as
Practice of Imitation, THE BURLINGTON MAGAZINE FOR CONNOISSEURS, Feb. 1942, at 40-45.
81. ALASDAIR MCINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 12 (1988).
82. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 1765-1769. 4 VOLS.
(Dover reprint ed., 1979); see also BLACKSTONE AND HIS COMMENTARIES (Wilfrid Prest ed., 2009);
REINTERPRETING BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES (Wilfrid Prest ed., 2012).
83. REYNOLDS, supra note 10, (I) at 81.
84. G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 454 (J. Sibree trans., 2007).
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another neoclassical creation. In keeping with the spirit of the times, the
Commentaries offer an image of art and law that mirrors and rivals that of
Reynolds's portraiture, and his Justice.
Perhaps .this surprising convergence makes a certain sense. In the
common law, the particulars of a case always challenge and modify the
application of abstract principles. Just so, the art of portraiture steered
Reynolds away from the somewhat idealized generalizations of his
Discourses and forced upon him an accounting for the embodied
particulars of individual identities. Not in philosophy or jurisprudence or
political theory is justice's struggle between particular and general most
productively encountered, but in the twin cases of portraiture and common
law.
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